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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CA TTLEMEN'S INVESTMENT CO. v. FEARS:
INFORMAL SOLICITATION OF STOCK HELD
TO CONSTITUTE A TENDER OFFER
In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears,' the District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma construed the term "tender offer"
of section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
by the Williams Act of 1968,2 to include the direct solicitation of
shares from a corporation's shareholders through utilization of the
mails, telephone calls and personal visits, whereby the offeror ac-
quired ownership of more than five percent of the company's out-
standing stock. During November and early December of 1971, the
defendant obtained either a legal or beneficial interest in a sufficient
number of shares of Cattlemen's Investment Company to increase his
total holdings in the stock from 4.86 percent to approximately twelve
percent.' The total stock acquired by the defendant therefore ex-
ceeded the five percent reporting limit fixed by section 14(d) which
requires the offeror of a tender offer to file specified background
information and statements of intent with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and to disclose prescribed information to
the target corporation piior to making an offer to shareholders to
purchase their holdings of the target company's stock. 5 The defendant
admitted that he had failed to comply.with the requirements of sec-
tion 14(d) but argued, in part, that his actions did not, as a matter of
law, constitute tender offers.' Determining that section 14(d) reflects
a congressional intent to regulate the solicitation activities involved
in the instant case,7 the court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the defendant from voting any stock of the plaintiff-
corporation acquired during the period in question.'
During the mid-1960's, the incidence of cash tender offers by
I. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970).
3. 343 F. Supp. at 1252.
4. Id. at 1250.
5. See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
6. 343 F. Supp. at 1250, 1252.
7. Id. at 1251-52.
8. Id. at 1253.
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outsiders for the purpose of gaining control of publicly held corpora-
tions increased dramatically Since no reporting or disclosure re-
quirements with respect to tender offers were prescribed in the 1934
Act,' " the managements of numerous large corporations were ab-
ruptly displaced in circumstances where the insiders had virtually no
opportunity to counter the "raiders' " offers." In view of this devel-
opment, Senator Williams of New Jersey introduced legislation for
the purpose of protecting incumbent management from what were
deemed to be reckless corporate raids. 2 While this proposal died in
9. See generally Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus.
LAW. 1637 (1971); Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. Rav.
609 (1967); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 317 (1967); Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90.439-Growing Pains?
Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. L. 654 (1971); Hamilton,
Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269 (1969); Kennedy, Tender
Moment, 23 Bus. LAW. 1091 (1968); O'Boyle, Changing Tactics in Tender Offers, 25 Bus.
LAW. 863 (1970); Young, Judicial Enforcement of the Williams Amendments: The Need to
Separate the Questions of Violation and Relief 27 Bus. LAW. 391 (1972); Note, Cash Tender
Offers, 83 HARV. L. REv. 377 (1969); Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Man-
agements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104 (1969).
The basic outline of a cash tender offer has been described in Griffin & Tucker, supra. The
authors state:
When the proposed take-over of a corporation is structured as a cash tender offer
the bidder requests, invites, or solicits tenders of shares of the target issuer in return for
a cash payment at a premium above the market price. In some instances the bidder
individually, or in conjunction with others, accumulates shares of the target issuer in the
market or through privately negotiated transactions. Id. at 657.
For a description of the fundamental characteristics of target corporations and "aggressor"
corporations, see Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAW. 611 (1968).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, ch. 404, § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) - (e), 78n(d) - (e) (1970).
II. See note 9 supra. Senator Kuchel of California, co-sponsor of the Williams Act, cited
the example of Columbia Motion Pictures as a particularly flagrant example of a take-over
bid. A Swiss branch of a French bank representing an unknown number of individuals made a
tender offer to purchase a large amount of Columbia stock. In fact, the bank purchased
approximately 675,000 shares, or thirty-four percent of the stock, which was then assigned
largely to two American mutual funds. Together with the bank, the mutual funds attempted
to gain control of the corporation without the incumbent management's having had an oppor-
tunity to counter the offer. Senator Kuchel contended that because of the possibility of foreign
take-overs, a grave question of national interest was involved in such transactions. 13 CONG.
REC. 858-59 (1967).
12. II1 CONG. REC. 28,257-60 (1965). The original proposal presented by Senator Williams
in 1965 was clearly hostile to attempted take-over bids and was designed to protect incumbent
managements from "corporate raiders." In introducing the bill, Senator Williams stated:
In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells after
white-collar pirates have seized control with funds from sources which are unknown in
many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up most of the loot
among themselves. Id. at 28,257.
The original bill required the notification of the target corporation and the filing of a public
1052 [Vol. 1972:1051
Vol. 1972:1051] TENDER OFFERS 1053
the 89th Congress, the SEC indicated its general concurrence with the
objectives of the bill and recommended extensive alterations which
were thereafter incorporated into a bill introduced in 1967 and passed
by Congress in 1968.13 Based upon the premise that investor confid-
ence in the securities market can be achieved only when all transac-
tions are conducted pursuant to full disclosure of material informa-
tion, the proposed legislation was designed to fill a gap in the existing
scheme of reporting requirements." Although Congress intended to
protect shareholders in target corporations by enacting certain re-
porting requirements, the measure reflected a congressional desire to
promote investor protection15 without unduly impeding cash takeover
bids. "
As enacted in 1968, the Williams Act renders unlawful activities
whereby any person utilizes the mails or any means of interstate
commerce "or otherwise" to acquire, by means of a tender offer,
more than ten percent (amended to five percent in 1971) of the shares
of a company's equity securities without first filing certain prescribed
statement with the SEC containing essential information at least twenty days before the making
of any cash tender offer which would result in the acquisition of, or would increase the owner-
ship of the offeror to, more than five percent of a class of security registered under the Act.
The bill covered acquisitions by any other means than a tender offer where the five percent
limit would have been exceeded.
13. S. 510 was later enacted as Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454
(1968), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) - (e), 78n(d) -
(I) (1970)). See 113 CoNa. REc. 854 (1967). See also S. REP. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1967); 113 CONG. REc. 24,662-66 (1967).
14. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968); S. REP. No. 550, supra
note 13, at 4.
15. The extent to which the co-sponsors of the bill, Senators Williams and Kuchel, intended
that the focus of S. 510 be changed from that of the bill that died in the 89th Congress is open
to question. During the hearings before the Senate Business and Finance Committee, Senator
Kuchel used language almost identical to that employed by Senator Williams when he intro-
duced the bill in 1965, when the focus was clearly upon the protection of incumbent manage-
ment. After Senator Kuchel's testimony on S. 510, Senator Williams commented that Senator
Kuchel had aptly expressed the sentiments of the entire committee. Compare Hearings on S.
510 Before the Subcomm. -n Securities of Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1967) with 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) and id. 24,662-66.
16. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967). See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 13, at 3-4.
It has been forcefully argued that take-over bids in the form of cash tender offers often serve
useful economic purposes:
[T]ake-over bids apparently tend to be made predominantly in circumstances in
which incumbent management or controllers have not distinguished themselves by the
success of their conduct of corporate business. The evidence indicates that acquisition
attempts have been made primarily with respect to corporations with lower rates of
return or net worth than comparable enterprises, and with histories of fluctuating or
declining earnings and dividends . . . . Moreover, the number of take-over bids made
DUKE LAW JO URNA L
information with the SEC.17 Notwithstanding this general rule, the
statute exempts certain transactions from regulation. Tender offers
made through a registration statement under the 1934 Act, 8 acquisi-
tions during the previous twelve months constituting not more than
two percent of the same class of target securities, 9 and offers made
by the issuer for its own securities are expressly excepted from the
purview of the statute."0 In addition to these specific exemptions, the
statute also provides that the SEC may properly elect not to regulate
certain offers which are "not entered into for the purpose of, and not
having the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer
1121
by persons intending to loot, or even to liquidate or dismantle, the enterprise appears
to be relatively small when compared with the number of take-over bids designed to
serve more respectable or legitimate purposes, however arguable may be their economic
merits. The evidence plainly does not justify impeding all the latter bids in order to deter
the former. Brudney, supra note 9, at 627.
An excellent analysis of the economic aspects of cash take-over bids is contained in Fleischer
& Mundheim, supra note 9, and in Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Take-Over Bids, 45
HARV. Bus. REv., March-April 1967, at 135, 138.
17. The original ten percent requirement was changed to five percent by Act of Dec. 22,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 3(2), 84 Stat. 1497, amending 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1964). 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970) presently provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securi-
ties exchange or otherwise; to make a tender offer for, or a request or invitation for
tenders of, any class of any equity security which is registered pursuant to section 781
of this title, or any equity security of an insurance company which would have been
required to be so registered except for the exemption contained in section 781(g)(2)(G)
of this title, or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, if, after consummation thereof, such person
would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such
class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or
sent or given to security holders such person has filed with the Commission a statement
containing such of the information specified in section 78m(d) of this title, and such
additional information as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors ....
The statute indicates the information which must be reported when a cash tender offer is
made within the ambit of section 14(d): (1) the background and identity of the person or group
on whose behalf the offer is being made; (2) the source and amount of funds available to the
person or group; (3) if the purpose of the merger is to take control, plans for liquidation,
merger, or major changes must be indicated; (4) the size of the holdings of the person or group
involved; (5) any contracts or arrangements already made relating to the shares.
Id. § 78m(d)(l) (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8) (1970).
19. Id. § 78n(d)(8)(A).
20. Id. § 78n(d)(8)(B).
21. Id. § 78n(d)(8)(C).
Congress granted broad rulemaking authority under the statute to the SEC whereby the
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Although the Williams Act was designed to regulate take-over
attempts, the statute does not specifically define the parameters of
"tender offer"-a primary method of achieving corporate control. As
normally used, "tender offer" connotes the public advertisement of
an offer to purchase, within a certain period of time, a quantity of
an equity security for a specified price above the prevailing market
rate.2" However, in view of statutory silence with respect to the mean-
ing of the term, -as well as the failure of the SEC through its regula-
tory powers to clarify the issue, resort must be made to both the
legislative history of the measure and to SEC-promulgated regula-
tions for guidance in reaching the appropriate understanding of the
term. With respect to congressional intent, three paramount legisla-
tive concerns which bear upon the type of economic activity sought
to be regulated are reflected in the statute. First, Congress desired to
provide investors holding an equity interest in a public corporation
with the information necessary to evaluate the potential impact of a
possible takeover.2 3 Second, a need was discerned to provide suffi-
cient time for shareholders to make a prudent investment decision
when confronted with an offer to purchase securities.24 Finally, the
legislation was deemed vital in order to insure equitable treatment of
investors.25 In addition to these broad legislative purposes, which
suggest an expansive understanding of "tender offer," the Senate and
House Reports clearly manifest an even broader congressional intent
to impose filing and disclosure obligations upon all persons or groups
attempting to acquire control of a corporation, regardless of whether
Commission would be enabled to distinguish for regulatory purposes between purely investment
acquisitions and acquisitions for control. By means of these rulemaking powers, the SEC has
periodically included other investor activities under the shield provided for shareholders by the
Williams Act. For example, the Commission has held that even an order to purchase equity
securities through a national securities exchange, which, if consummated, would increase the
buyer's total holdings to over five percent, constitutes a tender offer under section 14(d). SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968), reprinted in [1969-1970 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,715 (1969).
22. Two securities lawyers recently published an article outlining the more traditional
concepts of a tender offer, as understood in the business community, which the writers think
would be covered by the Williams Act:
a public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to
purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities
of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or
securities. Aranow & Einhorn, Essential Ingredients of the Cash Tender Invitation, 27
Bus. LAw. 415 (1972).
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the method utilized is proxy solicitation, a registered exchange offer
of securities, or a cash tender offer." Taking advantage of the con-
gressional failure to provide specific statutory guidelines in this area,
the SEC has not restricted the ambit of its regulatory concern by
attempting to define "tender offer."'2 7 The failure to delineate the
26. The first indication of congressional intent underlying the enactment of the Williams
Act was voiced by Senator Williams when he first introduced legislation to control tender offers
in 1965:
The legislation I propose as an amendment to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would
provide that any cash tender offers and, indeed, any substantial accumulation of shares
of a company registered under that act be preceded by the filing of public information
that provides answers to all of these questions. IIl CONG. REC. 28,259 (1965) (emphasis
added).
A sketch of the type of financial maneuvers which the Williams Act was designed to remedy
was presented at the Senate hearings in 1967.
By using a cash tender offer the person seeking control can operate in almost complete
secrecy. He need not state the source of his funds; who his associates are; why he wants
to acquire control of the corporation; and what he intends to do with it if he gains
control. Unless incumbent management takes newspaper ads explaining its position, the
investor has no facts before him on which to base a decision as to whether or not he
should accept the offer. Hearings on S. 510. supra note 15, at 2.
The basic purpose which the Act was designed to effectuate, as expressed in the House
hearings, was not "to prevent the making of any such offers, but solely the purpose of seeing
that investors adequately are informed of the relative merits of their position before and after
accepting such offers so that they can make a judgment properly required." Hearings on H.R.
14475 Before the Subcomnm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Coninm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968).
Perhaps the most inclusive statement of the intent behind the Williams Act was voiced at
the 1967 Senate debates:
The bill amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require the disclosure of perti-
nent information, first, when a person or group of persons seek to acquire a substantial
block of equity securities of a corporation by a cash tender offer or through the open
market or privately negotiated purchases, and second, when a corporation repurchases
its own equity securities. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
Based on the assumption that secrecy has no place in the securities market where public
confidence is vital, Chairman Cohen of the SEC indicated, both before and during the hearings,
his desire for uniform reporting requirements, regardless of the method utilized in obtaining
substantial amounts of equity securities:
If we are to retain and build investors' confidence in the integrity of our securities
markets, so vital to the free flow and development of capital in our country, we must
place all participants in the securities markets in a position to compete on an equal
footing with respect to the availability of significant facts about a company, its manage-
ment and its securities. This is the premise on which our securities markets are supposed
to work, and all Americans, whether shareholders or not, have a vital stake in making
sure that it is a correct one. Cohen, A Note on Take-Over Bids and Corporate Purchases
of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149, 157 (1966).
27. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 9, Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp.
1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972):
[Tjhe Commission has not restricted itself by adopting a definition of the term tender
offer, but has instead chosen to excise by rule certain limited types of transactions which
would otherwise fall within the terminology in question.
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meaning of the term can reasonably be viewed as indicative of an
SEC preference for the present ambiguity of the statute as a vehicle
for regulating varied types of conduct tending to effect corporate
control. 28
In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears,29 the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had violated the 1934 Act, as amended by the Williams
Act, by virtue of his active campaign to acquire shares of the plaintiff-
corporation in excess of five percent, without complying with the
registration and notification requirements established by section
14(d) °.3  In addition to interposing several threshold defenses, includ-
ing an argument attacking the propriety of the plaintiff's maintaining
the action, 31 the defendant urged that his actions were not within the
purview of the 1934 Act and, more specifically, were outside the
meaning of the term "tender offer" as employed by Congress.3 2 In
rejecting the defendant's arguments, the court postulated that, since
the Williams Act was intended to serve as a remedial statute, the
measure should be interpreted liberally to effectuate legislative pur-
poses.13 Accordingly, the court accepted the proposition that the
target company itself has standing to sue the tender offeror for viola-
28. See Note, 83 HARV. L. REv., supra note 9, at 388. Despite its previous failure to
formulate a definition, the SEC, in its amicus brief in the instant case, contended that the
legislation "must be read expansively and not be restricted to the traditional form of an
advertisement of a general offer to shareholders." Brief for SEC, supra note 27, at 8.
29. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
30. Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla.
1972).
31. These defenses were premised upon the contention that the plaintiff-corporation did not
have standing to sue inasmuch as the statute was designed to benefit shareholders, not manage-
ment. Brief for Defendant at 3-6, Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla.
1972).
32. Id. at 11-12. In examining the remarks by Senator Williams, set forth in note 12 supra,
as utilized by the plaintiff in its brief, the defendant relied on assertions of grammatical
construction in presenting his argument:
It is obvious that any definition which contains the term to be defined [tender offer] is
useless; and it is equally obvious through the use of the disjunctive "or" that Senator
Williams considered both "privately negotiated purchases" and purchases made
"through the open market" as different from a "tender offer." If anything, the instant
case would appear to involve "privately negotiated purchases." Id. at 11.
The defendant then turned to a more valid area of inquiry by challenging the definition and
usage of the term "tender offer" according to traditional concepts of the term: "a general offer
to shareholders by means of wide publicity to all known shareholders." Id.
33. 343 F. Supp. at 1251. For prior suppdrt of this approach, the court relied upon Tcherep-
nin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) and Marriott v. National Mut. Gas Co., 195 F.2d 462,
466 (10th Cir. 1952).
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tions of the statute.34 After determining that the plaintiff-
corporation could properly maintain an action under the Williams
Act, the court examined the scope of "tender offer" by resort to the
provision's legislative history. In its analysis the court discerned a
congressional desire to provide stockholders in public-issue corpora-
tions with "material information with respect to the potential impact
of any effort to acquire control of a company . . ." so that an ade-
quate opportunity for making a prudent investment decision would
exist.35 Closely paralleling the interpretations of "tender offer" prof-
fered by the SEC in its amicus curiae brief30 and by the plaintiff,37
the court concluded that:
the activities of the defendant in making contact with plaintiff's shareholders
by use of the mails, telephone calls, and personal visits, for the purpose of
purchasing their shares, constitute "tender offers for, or a request or invitation
for tender offers of" their stock within the meaning of the statute.38
According to the court, both the corporation and the shareholders
had been deprived of information upon which an intelligent invest-
ment decision could be based.3 Therefore, the court enjoined the
defendant from voting his newly acquired shares until after a trial of
the action on the merits.4"
34. In determining that the corporation had standing to sue for injunctive relief, the court
relied upon the Second Circuit's decision in Electronics Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). In that case, the court had held that, in view of the most
appropriate manner to accomplish the purposes of the Williams Act, a target corporation has
standing to complain of an offeror's violation of the Act.
As to the propriety of granting injunctive relief in the instant case, the court indicated that
corporate "rigor mortis" was not a requisite to such relief. Indeed, the court concluded that in
requesting injunctive relief, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that there would otherwise be
a sufficiently adverse effect that the resulting harm would be irreparable. See United Egg
Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
35.. 343 F. Supp. at 1251 (emphasis added).
36. Brief for SEC, supra note 27, at 7.
37. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 30, at 4-6.
38. 343 F. Supp. at 1252.
39. Id. at 1253. The court's analysis with respect to the corporation's need for the pre-
scribed information is unclear. Although the court indicates that the information is necessary
for making "investment decisions," id., there was no allegation that the corporation itself was
a shareholder, nor that the defendant had made an offer to purchase to the corporation in the
latter's capacity as a shareholder.
40. The plaintiff also sought to enjoin the defendant for a period of five years from acquir-
ing additional shares and from exercising any voting rights of the shares owned by him, thereby
including the voting rights of those shares properly acquired at an earlier time. Significantly,




Cattlemen's represents an exercise in proper judicial craftsman-
ship inasmuch as the court construed a legislatively undefined term
to accurately reflect underlying congressional intent, notwithstanding
a more limited, common understanding of that concept. Despite the
defensible viewpoint that, by failure to specify to the contrary, Con-
gress employed "tender offer" in its normal sense, an examination
of the hearings and reports relating to the Williams Act indicates that
the co-sponsors of the measure intended a much broader construction
of the statutory terms than the interpretation used by the segment of
the business community at which the legislation was directed. Sena-
tors Williams and Kuchel had indicated that their primary concern
was the creation of a protective shield for management from any sort
of surprise take-over bid by outsiders.4 In short, the broad language
used in the reports issued by the Senate and House Committees in
defining the purpose and design of the bill, coupled with the broad
rule-making authority accorded the SEC by the Act,42 leaves little
doubt that the intent of Congress was supportive of a generous read-
ing of "tender offer." It is also apparent that, since the measure's
enactment, the SEC has sought to insure widespread compliance with
the reporting requirements of the statute by failing to delimit specifi-
cally the scope of a tender offer through definition or regulation. The
Commission has sought to encompass all varieties of activity de-
signed as take-over bids within the scope of its regulatory powers.
Such vagueness in legislative terminology,43 as well as the tactics
employed by the SEC, was likely to result in considerable confusion
with respect to the meaning of "tender offer." Therefore, it is not
surprising that the defendant in the instant case, when charged with
a violation of section 14(d) due to his acquisition of stock by means
of direct personal contacts with shareholders, as opposed to the me-
dium of public advertisement, raised the defense of not having ex-
tended a "tender offer" as the term is generally defined. Nevertheless,
in view of the remedial nature of the legislation, the liberal readings
traditionally accorded such acts by the courts,44 and the obvious legis-
lative intent behind the Williams Act, it seems clear that the court in
41. It should again be noted that the co-sponsors' acquiescence in the SEC-sponsored
change in emphasis to the protection of shareholders was seemingly superficial so far as their
broad intentions were concerned. See note 15 supra.
42. See notes 17 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
43. The entire Act speaks in terms of". . . copies of the offer or request or invitation. ..
[being] published or sent or given to security holders." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1970).
44. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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Cattlemen's properly construed the statute. As to legislative drafts-
manship, however, the wisdom of leaving completely to the courts the
task of defining a highly fundamental term when the potential for
conflict in the federal courts is quite substantial can be seriously
questioned. Moreover, prior to the Cattlemen's decision, reluctance
in the business community to employ the cash tender offer as an
economic tool resulting from both legislative vagueness and potential
judicial conflict could have operated to limit the beneficial aspects of
cash tender offers-a result which Congress explicitly intended to
avoid. In sum, the Cattlemen's decision not only embodies an appro-
priate statutory construction but, in addition, ameliorates the proba-
ble adverse business consequences flowing from previous confusion
as to the reach of federal regulation of take-over bids.
